Class, Race and Corporate Power
Volume 2

Issue 2

Article 4

2014

An Honest Presidential Address on the Iraq Situation
Ronald W. Cox
Florida International University, coxr@fiu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/classracecorporatepower
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Cox, Ronald W. (2014) "An Honest Presidential Address on the Iraq Situation," Class, Race and Corporate
Power: Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 4.
DOI: 10.25148/CRCP.2.2.16092114
Available at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/classracecorporatepower/vol2/iss2/4

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts, Sciences & Education at FIU Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Class, Race and Corporate Power by an authorized administrator
of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.

An Honest Presidential Address on the Iraq Situation
Abstract
This essay is a mock Presidential address designed to highlight the long-term consequences of the US
occupation of Iraq.
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My fellow Americans, I have chosen this moment in history to do something unprecedented and
present the truth about the history of US intervention and occupation of Iraq. It seems an
opportune moment to simply let the record speak for itself so that no one is under any illusions
about our limited options going forward.
When the George W. Bush Administration made the decision to target Iraq as part of the neverending war on terror in 2003, it was apparent that this intervention was no different from our
long history of military interventions and occupations from the Spanish-American War to the
present. We can nitpick about how Democrats preferred a steady strangulation of Iraq with
sanctions and selective bombing missions versus the Bush Administration’s cowboy approach,
but once we as a country committed to invasion and occupation, it was with the cooperation of
both political parties. Most of the prominent Democrats, so cowed by the military-industrial
complex, voted to give Bush an open-ended legislative authority to do whatever he pleased
(something I used to my advantage in that Presidential race…where I muttered something about
hope and change). The news media helped matters here by shying away from uncomfortable, let
alone controversial, questions. They are indeed the best press corps money and flattery can buy!
So Bush authorized the invasion and occupation, and we did our usual thing. First, we began our
systematic violation of international law by occupying a country that posed no threat to our
national interests. Second, we abruptly rewrote the Iraqi constitution during the early stages of
the occupation, another violation of international law. (International law is awfully useful when
we want to charge others of war crimes, but becomes an annoying dishrag that we must discard
when thrown at us!) We’ve used this playbook before, and we’ve carried it out successfully for
long stretches of imperial history. In Iraq, we devised this cute-sounding Coalition Provisional
Authority to govern the country, and it was our man Paul Bremer who was calling the shots for
the entire country during most of the first two years of the occupation. He doled out privileged
contracts for US corporations, opened up the Iraqi market for US exports, presided over the
systematic dismantling of the Iraqi bureaucracy (and with that helped fan the flames of ethnic
tension) and facilitated a US presence in virtually all the important Iraqi ministries.1 It seems
that foreign oil corporations were poised to benefit enormously from these changes, and many
were active in helping to shape the terms of long-term petroleum contracts in the country. All
appeared consistent with US history and with US occupations.
But, as with past interventions, things got messy pretty quickly. The Iraqis started to insist on
early elections, when we just wanted to make sure they were ready to exercise their vote.
Typically the way it works is that the market is divided for corporate and propertied interests
first, their rights are locked in, and only then can the little people be allowed to exercise their
voting rights. To extend democracy to the masses before property rights for the privileged were
etched into law would violate every precept of capitalist history and so-called “democratic
transition.” Scholars are often on board with US democracy promotion nowadays. What a
change from those turbulent 1960s and 1970s!
Despite our best intentions, those Iraqis continued to insist on early voting by staging numerous
loud demonstrations and protests. So we were stuck between a proverbial Iraq and a hard place.
Ha! Prominent Shiites urged the masses to mobilize, preaching the necessity of voting rights to

establish an independent Iraqi legislature, a maneuver that would surely lessen the influence of
our Coalition Provisional Authority. We would have looked very bad if we simply resisted this
popular pressure, so we did what we usually do: We expanded our ground warfare to undertake
some rather ghastly and unpleasant interventions. We killed a lot of civilians, especially in
Falluja, and left a lot of depleted uranium waste in neighborhoods that are still being affected to
this day with high cancer rates and a very high rate of birth defects. But we have to understand
this as the price of bringing freedom and democracy to Iraqis. We simply had to clean house so
that Iraqi political institutions would be less contaminated by opposition groups—namely the
Sunni towns that we had disproportionately targeted in our ground campaign.
As part of this effort, we enlisted the services of General David Petraeus, that shining knight of
charisma who was fawned over in a very bipartisan fashion every time he appeared on Capitol
Hill. Petraeus had an idea that was called “the Salvador option.” This refers to the US military
intervention in the Salvadoran civil war during the 1980s, when a US group of special force
advisors, led by Colonel Jim Steele, trained Salvadoran military units to wage war against rebel
groups that we opposed. Essentially, the US special advisors provided the expertise and
knowledge necessary to train the activities of Salvadoran death squads who engaged in
indiscriminate terror against civilian populations, all to destroy the enemy by destroying any
villages that housed the enemy. You know: old-fashioned counter-insurgency!
Fortunately, Col. Steele himself was available, after all these years, to assist Petraeus in
formulating the Salvador option for Iraq. Who better to lead this effort than a man with a lot of
experience? Col. Steele was given the authority to supervise the training of the Iraqi Special
Police Commandos, who would operate much like the Salvadoran death squads did. In fact, to
make this easier, the US lifted the ban on the participation of violent Shia militias like the Badr
Brigade and the Mahdi Army in these Special Police Commandos. This way, the Commandos,
equipped with a multimillion dollar US budget, could undertake “all means necessary” in razing
villages, killing suspected Sunni insurgents, and leveling the playing field through indiscriminate
acts of terror, including the torturing of political prisoners that continues to this day.2 At the
same time, Petraeus and Steele had enough cash to offer a deal to Sunni militia leaders who had
been inclined to fight the Iraqi government. The deal was: We’ll pay you to join us if you
abandon the fight against the Iraqi government, and we’ll shower hard currency on your
communities as a further reward. Boy did we do our job well! Elections were held, but at the
same time that US-led military operations were being conducted. Elections by any means
necessary, just as in El Salvador!
Petraeus was summarily praised by many of the talking head pundits, and Congressmen could
not wait to be photographed next to him. After his Salvador option for Iraq was deemed a
success, he seemed a natural to take his skills on the road to Afghanistan. Although our
relationship was not always smooth, I picked him as my nominee to head the Central Intelligence
Agency. This is yet another indication of the kind of bipartisanship that the US establishment is
known for in its foreign policy choices.
The only problem with militarizing our presence to such an extent in Iraq and around the world
is that it has this rather regrettable tendency to produce blowback, a CIA term that Petraeus
understands very well. Blowback is when our policies generate consequences that end up

rebounding against us. Unfortunately, we are now seeing this in Iraq, due to our policies which
helped make the Iraqi state one of the most repressive in the world. You can look it up, but Iraq
ranks very high among states in the torture of political prisoners, the jailing of political
opponents, the systematic discrimination against Sunnis both in restrictions of civil liberties and
significant obstacles to effective political participation.3 The very policies we have encouraged
in Iraq seem to be encouraging revolutionary mobilization against the Iraqi state that we helped
construct! I kept trying to tell Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to go easy on this extreme
sectarian stuff, knowing full well that we opened the barn door on this one. Ha! But I figured
that the Iraqi state had at the very least been so well-trained in all the repressive stuff that it
would be well-equipped to put down rebellions.
Boy was I wrong! My opponents are using the rising strength of the group Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) to make political hay over my supposed tendency to retreat too quickly from our
commitments. But many of my opponents were onboard with our de-escalation strategy at the
time, and besides I had to at least appear to give some scraps to the left-wingers in my own party,
who can become pretty obstinate about this non-intervention thing. In fact, the American public
is rather overwhelmingly opposed to any further expansion of US military intervention, which of
course goes against the raison d'être of the imperial state that I am helping to construct.
So it’s back to being caught between Iraq and a hard place again. There are really no good
options for us despite our imperial bluster. One of our main allies in the region, Saudi Arabia, is
a funding source for ISIS, which has helped them amp up their activities in Syria and now Iraq.
Meanwhile, and this is where the world really gets funny, our arch-enemy Iran is eager to take
the lead in fortifying the Iraqi government from further destabilizing attacks. As my predecessor
might have said, it is hard work being an imperial power these days. Even our repressive
governments appear to have a shorter shelf-life that usual. But somehow we’ll muddle through
with a likely bombing campaign, perhaps to show our strength in the region, even if it
accomplishes nothing more than killing innocent civilians. I can’t be too bothered with that
concern, what with the drone strikes and all. We have to be seen as doing something, after
all…..
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